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 ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines member mobilization using a British community organization 
and a British trade union as exemplars. Although there has been substantial work on 
union revitalization on the one hand, and the emergence of alternative, community 
organizations on the other, no study has compared the challenges these organizations 
face, in encouraging member mobilization. The focus is on member commitment and 
the organization’s legitimacy: the trade union gains merely pragmatic legitimacy from 
its members and the relationship between the member and the union is mainly 
instrumental, based on a negotiated exchange. The community organization, in 
contrast, gains moral legitimacy from its members and exemplifies a productive 
exchange between the members and the group.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION  
 
When I first came to Cornell University, I started working with my advisor, Professor 
Lowell Turner, on an innovative US trade union campaign called ‘Hotel Workers 
Rising’. The campaign was led by the union Unite HERE and took place mainly at a 
national level. Through my research on this hotel campaign, however, I discovered a 
collaboration between this big American trade union and a small community-based 
organization in London that I’d never heard of, London Citizens (LC).  
I started to conduct some phone interviews to see what London Citizens was 
all about and took a closer look at the literature on social movements, organizational 
studies, and the debate around trade unions versus alternative forms of workers’ 
representation. What did this tiny organization in London have to offer a massive 
organization such as Unite HERE? My curiosity only grew, so I decided to spend six 
weeks with London Citizens during the summer of 2008 to figure out what kind of 
organization it was.  
Rather than start off from concrete hypotheses or research questions, I went 
into the field collecting data on this organization which I hoped would allow me to 
generate a new theory or at least contribute to the current theoretical debates; in other 
words, I took a so-called grounded theory approach. I learned as much as possible 
about LC’s emergence, campaigning strategy, organizational structure, challenges and 
role in society. As a participant observer, I attended LC meetings, followed the 
training sessions, and was involved in the campaigns. I immediately knew this wasn’t 
going to be a desk job. On July 11, 2008 we held a ‘Zimbabwe Action’: within five 
days of the training, I found myself in the middle of Parliament Square, singing and 
dancing, surrounded by thousands of Zimbabweans and Britons; since the majority of 
 2
the Zimbabweans are refused asylum-seekers living clandestinely in England, London 
Citizens called for them to have the right to work. I was amazed by London Citizens’ 
dynamics, its energy, and its capacity to mobilize thousands of people.  
During my time in London, I conducted many interviews, not only with LC 
staff, organizers, and members, but with union representatives and influential scholars, 
as well. In these interviews I heard the same thing over and over again: whether the 
interviewees agreed or not with London Citizens’ politics, they were all amazed at the 
organization’s mobilization capacity. This is what spurred this Masters Thesis 
question: what explains the astonishing member mobilization of this tiny community 
organization? Or to what extent and how have community organizations been able to 
develop an active grassroots base?  
 
 ‘Representation Gap’ 
Over the last three decades, the system of worker representation based on trade 
unionism and collective bargaining has been eroding, raising concerns about the 
emergence of a ‘representation gap’ (Towers 1997). In the UK, the majority of 
employees are no longer covered by collective bargaining, and a unilateral decision 
taken by the employer is now the most frequent method of setting the terms of 
employment (Cully et al. 1999). Even the German Metalworkers Union (IG Metall), a 
powerful 2.3 million member organization, has been confronted with a declining 
membership (Turner 2009).1 With globalization and the loss of unionized 
manufacturing jobs, trade unions are facing a special challenge trying to represent 
low-paid service workers. Their difficulties organizing these and other workers can be 
                                                 
1 In the US, overall union membership dropped from 23.5% in 1973 to 12.4% in 2003. Concerning the 
UK, the union density dropped from 50.4% in 1980 to 29.3% and for Germany from 34.9% in 1980 to 
22.6% in 2003. For the US 13.8% and for the UK 35% of the workforce were covered by collective 
bargaining agreements in 2003. For Germany 63% of the workforce was covered by collective 
bargaining agreements in 2006 (Bispinck 2008; Visser 2006). 
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ascribed to factors such as the change in the economic structure; the transition from 
goods-producing to service-producing industries, resulting in outsourcing and 
subcontracting; the increase of ‘born’ non-union jobs; and employer hostility towards 
trade unions.  
These external factors, however, are not the only reason for union decline. 
Unions face internal challenges as well. First, unions suffer from a loss of legitimacy 
(Chaison and Bigelow 2002). They are often perceived as vested interests groups 
based on purely pragmatic legitimacy. Their actions are narrowed down to workplace 
related issues, falling short of the wider social world vision (Moody 2007). Allan 
Flanders (1970) wrote ‘trade unions have always had two faces, sword of justice and 
vested interest. But it is the second, rather than the first, that is now turned most 
frequently to public view’ (15). One of the challenges for the unions is to win back 
their legitimacy, to ‘revive and to redefine the role as sword of justice’ (Hyman 2004).  
Second, unions suffer from membership disaffection and low levels of member 
commitment, which in turn affects member mobilization (Lawler et al. 2009; 
Lévesque et al. 2005). Many members consider the union an institution providing 
protection, their contribution a mere payment for a service. According to Flanders 
(1970), trade unions must be a mixture of movement and organization, providing the 
vitality and power needed to survive. Indeed, an active layer of members is needed to 
keep the movement alive, keeping the union dynamic, able to adjust to a changing 
environment.  
This mutual reinforcement of the internal and external challenges has strongly 
contributed to the decline in union membership and density, leading to the so-called 
‘representation gap’. Facing this dilemma of representation, scholars have proposed 
two types of solutions. Revitalizing unions, and thus maintaining the role of collective 
bargaining and of trade unions to represent workers, is one way to fight the decline; 
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this has spurred a plethora of literature covering trade union revitalization (e.g., Frege 
and Kelly 2003; Heery, Kelly and Waddington 2003; Johnston 1994; Turner, Katz, 
and Hurd eds. 2001). Another way is by emphasizing alternative forms of worker 
representation, such as community-based organizations and worker centers; a growing 
body of literature covers the emergence of these alternative forms and the difficult 
collaboration between these organizations and traditional trade unions (e.g., Fine 
2005, 2006, 2007; Osterman 2001, 2006a; Tattersall 2005; Tattersall and Reynolds 
2007; Wills and Simms 2004).  
My approach is novel. I start off from what seems to be a paradox: Trade 
unions have numerous members and resources, but find it very difficult to mobilize 
their members. Community organizations, on the other hand, have much smaller 
memberships, don’t have as many resources, but display a tremendous capacity for 
mobilizing their bases. By comparing both organizations, I show that managing 
legitimacy and nurturing member commitment are critical in explaining sustained 
member mobilization. Based on data gathered in the UK, I examine the challenges of 
London Citizens, the oldest, largest, and most important community-based 
organization in the UK, and of Connect, a small British union for professionals in 
communications.2  
My main argument is that community organizations’ capacity for developing 
strong member commitment and gaining moral legitimacy from their members and the 
public will lead to sustained member mobilization. Trade unions, on the other hand, 
encounter difficulties in cultivating member commitment and are granted only 
                                                 
2 In comparing trade unions with community organizations, I try to control for size as much as possible. 
Trade unions can be million member organizations, whereas community organizations go only into the 
thousands. In this case, LC is the broadest community organization, with over 120 institutional 
members. Connect, on the other hand, although a small union, still has about 20,000 members. In terms 
of sheer size, comparing these two organizations thus makes sense. 
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pragmatic legitimacy from their members, resulting in short-term member 
mobilization.  
The layout of this thesis is as follows: In the first chapter, after describing my 
methodology, I discuss the similarities and differences between trade unions and 
community-based organizations, stressing for both the importance of mobilization. In 
chapter 2, I will describe in more detail my theoretical argument, showing how critical 
it is for organizations to manage legitimacy and nurture social commitment. Chapter 
three and four will be case studies, illustrating the structure, strategy, and organizing 
campaigns of one community organization, London Citizens, and one British union, 
Connect. Chapter five will provide a comparative analysis. In my conclusion, I stress 
the importance for organizations of gaining legitimacy and cultivating social 
commitment. I then make some recommendations and suggest ideas for future 
research.  
Please note that I use the name London Citizens, although the organization 
started out as The East London Citizens Organization, or TELCO. The organization 
expanded to the West and the South of London and its umbrella name became London 
Citizens. 
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CHAPTER 2 
METHODOLOGY  
 
I collected the data for this study in 2008-2009, conducting over 40 interviews. My 
research methodology has been qualitative, gathering data mainly through participant 
observation, interviews, and examination of archival documents. In the summer of 
2008, I spent six weeks with the community organization London Citizens. This 
involvement gave me critical insights and deepened my understanding of how the 
organization works.  I interviewed not only LC staff, organizers, and members, but 
union officials and influential scholars, as well.  
In June 2009, I attended the Trades Union Council (TUC) Organizing 
Academy Summer School at Ruskin College, Oxford, on ‘Organizing in Economic 
Downturn’. This four-day workshop, offering perspectives on campaigning methods 
and providing tools for strategic decision-making for capacity building and union 
growth, was aimed at twenty union officers and organizers from diverse UK trade 
unions. This event gave me the opportunity to closely examine their organizing 
strategies and led to many informal conversations with the participants from six 
different UK unions on the themes of trade union challenges, union decision-making, 
organizing, and member commitment. 
  I conducted over 40 interviews, mostly recorded, with LC community 
members and organizers and with British trade union officers and organizers on the 
subject of organizing strategies, member commitment, and the power and influence of 
the organization in the society. I had multiple meetings with scholars from LSE, 
London Metropolitan University, Queen Mary, and the University of London 
(Birkbeck College), who shared their expertise on the matter, leading to interesting 
discussions.  
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Regarding the Connect case study, I interviewed union representatives of 
different positions within the union: the union president, union officers, the director of 
organizing, union organizers, and lay representatives. However, to strengthen the 
external validity of my case, I conducted interviews with national and regional officers 
of Unison (UK’s largest public sector union); union organizers of Britain’s biggest 
union, Unite; and national and regional organizers of Britain’s trade unions’ umbrella 
organization, the Trades Union Congress (TUC). Furthermore, I analysed documents 
concerning the strategies of other UK unions such as the transport union (RMT), the 
Public and Commercial Services union (PCS), and the Union of Shop, Distributive 
and Allied Workers (USDAW). These additional sources gave me an accurate picture 
of the overall situation in the UK concerning British unions’ internal struggles on 
issues of member commitment and organizing strategies.  
London Citizens was selected for this study because as a grassroots 
organization it derives its fundamental power from mobilizing its members. In 
addition, it is the oldest, largest and most important community-based organization in 
the UK (Wills 2006, Holgate 2008). Connect was selected for the following reasons: 
this rather small union puts a strong emphasis on organizing. The union has a 
dedicated organizing team and is on an ongoing basis involved in different high-
profile campaigns. As their website announces, this is a ‘campaigning union’ which 
currently is trying to get recognition at Vodafone, T-Mobile, and O2.  Moreover, the 
union structure allowed me to compare newly set up branches, for example at 
Vodafone, with well-established branches, for example at British 
Telecommunications, to examine the similarities and differences regarding member 
mobilization.3   
                                                 
3 A union ‘branch’ in the UK is the equivalent of a US local union. 
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I use the case study as my main research strategy. According to Yin (2003), the 
case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly delineated (13). In chapter one I will draw analogies between 
trade unions and community organizations. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TRADE UNIONS AND COMMUNITY-BASED ORGANIZATIONS  
 
In this section, I illustrate why it is useful to compare trade unions with community-
based organizations and why member mobilization is important in both cases. I do not 
argue that trade unions should become community organizations or vice versa, since 
each type of organization has its own specificities and role in society, and it is clear as 
well that neither of the organizations aspires to fully become the other. Nonetheless, I 
show that there are significant similarities between the two, providing the opportunity 
for new insights and laying the ground for mutual learning.  
How different are community-based organizations from trade unions? The 
term community organization has been used throughout the literature in different 
ways, for example, according to Milofsky (1988) community organizations are 
“generally small, loose structured, voluntaristic, and heavily democratic organizations 
that identify themselves with a specific geographic area of a city, town, or rural area” 
(3); Marwell (2007) defines community-based organizations as operating only in that 
local area, having as their mission to attend to the needs of disadvantaged community 
members and drawing on significant community members participation. I focus on a 
specific type, the IAF (Industrial Areas Foundation) model, the origins of which go 
back to Saul Alinsky’s model in 1930s Chicago. Today there are over 59 IAF affiliates 
organizing in 21 US states, as well as in Canada, Germany, and the UK.  
The main characteristics are the following: These organizations are deeply 
rooted in geographic communities. Their dues-paying members are civic society 
institutions such as churches, schools or trade unions, providing the organization a 
certain level of stability and making it a membership-based organization rather than a 
charitable institution (Zald and Denton 1963). These broad-based organizations 
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revolve around multiple-issue campaigns, considering labor market concerns a by-
product of their larger agenda (Osterman 2006a). Their goal is to accrue power and 
bring social change, mostly through the use of public advocacy and collective action 
in order to improve the living and working conditions of the community and beyond. 
Finally, their core activity for gaining power and strength is leadership development 
and training. I argue that these organizations fall somewhere between full-blown 
bureaucratic organizations and social movement organizations (SMOs).4 On the one 
hand, they have dues-paying members, paid professional staff, and offices, but on the 
other hand, their goal is to bring about social change and build capacity in their 
communities principally through the use of public policy, leadership development, or 
(disruptive) collective action.  
A central focus of community-based organizations is indeed leadership 
development and their engagement in building ‘relational power’5. One key activity is 
to identify and develop activists and organizational leaders from within the ranks of 
low-wage workers or other institutions, so that the workers/members develop their 
own voice within the organization itself, resulting in direct participation in the 
decision-making process and the capacity to speak and act for themselves. According 
to Fine (2006), this emphasis on leadership development leads to high staff 
commitment and low staff turnover. In addition, the organization focuses on trust and 
cooperation between and among people to get things done. Lead organizers of 
community organizations have many one-to-one conversations with leaders from the 
                                                 
4 A social movement organization can be defined as a complex, formal organization; there must be a 
degree of temporal continuity; movements are change-oriented; movements have at least one target; 
most current definitions acknowledge that movements must use some extra-institutional tactics (e.g., 
protests or demonstrations); they are characterized by a collective identity; and finally, there is some 
form of leadership (e.g., Jenkins 1983). 
5 Relational power is a term used by the Industrial Areas Foundation to describe the type of power the 
organization seeks to build, namely, the power to act collectively together through the initiation and 
multiplication of “effective public relationships” (e.g., Orr 2001). 
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member institutions to strengthen their relationship. Increasing the ‘relational power’ 
is considered the key factor in community building.  
Community organizations differ from traditional trade unions in the following 
ways: first, community organizations are non-bargaining actors (Givan 2007) and 
therefore have less economic power. These organizations are not part of the collective 
bargaining process and thus their main strategy for achieving change is not workplace 
related; rather, they work through advocacy and mobilization, putting pressure on the 
employers or the policy makers through local community organizing, thus bridging the 
traditional work/home gap, and building coalitions with organizational allies. Case 
studies have shown that a key to their success lies in their ability to mobilize 
thousands of people (Osterman 2006a, Holgate and Wills 2007).6 Second, community 
organizations are composed of civic institutions, trade unions of individual members. 
This institutional membership base gives the community organization a certain degree 
of stability (even when people move away from town, the church or school will still be 
there), bestows legitimacy (Suchman 1995), and provides much needed resources 
(Osterman 2006a).  
These organizations, on the other hand, show important similarities as well, 
making a comparison fruitful. First, community-based organizations, just as trade 
unions must be seen as drivers for economic and social change seeking improvements 
in the members’ living and working conditions. Although community organizations 
don’t exclusively focus on labor issues, for many IAF organizations, the living wage 
campaign has been one of their key activities.7 It is clear, therefore, that certain goals, 
such as higher wages, are absolutely in line with those of the trade unions.  
                                                 
6 If I take into consideration the entire group of civil society organizations, service delivery rather than 
mobilization comes in first place. The specific model of community organizations I look at (i.e., the 
IAF model) clearly prioritizes mobilization over servicing members.   
7 Other issues are affordable housing, safety in the streets, etc. 
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Second, shifting the lens to the unions, although collective bargaining is 
essential to a union’s success, stress is increasingly being put on mobilizing members: 
Some scholars have emphasized the need for ‘rank and file’ renewal, focusing on the 
development of active and participatory workplace unionism (Fairbrother 1996, 2002). 
Member participation and mobilization are considered key in reversing union decline.8 
In the US, for example, there has been a shift from a ‘servicing model’, or business 
unionism, to an ‘organizing model’ of trade unionism (Blyton and Turnbull 1998, 
Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1998, Fletcher and Hurd 1998). As many authors have 
shown, this US model of organizing has been adopted in the UK (e.g., Fiorito 2004; 
Heery 2002). The concept of ‘organizing model’ emphasizes organizing workers, 
empowering them through campaigns and mobilization. There is a “union building” 
approach to membership growth, in which the union will foster activism and 
leadership, a crucial element of community organizing as well. Furthermore, unions 
will not only show their effectiveness in improving employment conditions, but they 
will emphasize moral discourse, using language of “justice”, “dignity”, and “respect.” 
They stress the “qualitative” function of unionism in providing protection and voice 
within the workplace (Hyman 1997). This path of renewal focuses on union 
revitalization by such means as comprehensive campaigns, coalition building, and 
demands phrased in terms of social justice. Turner, Katz and Hurd (eds. 2001), for 
example, have shown how trade unions successfully won their campaigns by framing 
the debate in broad social justice, rather than narrow economic terms. 
Other scholars, however, emphasized a ‘managerial’ form of renewal (e.g., 
Heery 2003), focusing on a more top-down approach to revitalize trade unions. 
According to this strategy, union leaders at the national level would, for example, 
apply performance management systems in order to achieve a certain number of new 
                                                 
8 For an opposing argument see Hickey, Kuruvilla, Lakhani (2009). 
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members per year.9  A strong national, centralized union leadership would monitor the 
progress toward these goals. A growing body of literature (Bach and Givan 2008, 
Bronfenbrenner and Hickey 2004, Milkman 2006), nonetheless, suggests that this 
dualism between ‘rank and file’ and a ‘managerial’ form of renewal represents a false 
dichotomy. In order to revitalize, unions should adopt a ‘hybrid’ approach: combining 
grassroots participation with strong, national level union policy, in other words, 
combining bottom-up with top-down strategies. Following this rationale for trade 
union revitalization, it is clear that workers’ mobilization is pivotal. In addition, since 
mobilizing campaigns can go on for years (e.g., Connect’s Vodafone campaign took 
15 years), developing sustained mobilization is crucial. 
In sum, first, there is a striking similarity between the union renewal elements 
– leadership development, social justice framework, and member mobilization – and 
the characteristics of community organizations mentioned before, allowing for a 
constructive comparison. Second, it is clear that workers’ or members’ mobilization is 
critical to trade union revitalization as it is to community-based organizations. In the 
next chapter I will describe my theoretical framework, focusing on the concepts of 
legitimacy and commitment. 
 
                                                 
9 For example, Unison, UK’s largest public sector union, establishes specific aims and goals each year 
that cascade down to the shop steward and worker representatives (Bach and Givan 2008). 
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CHAPTER 4 
SUSTAINED MOBILIZATION 
 
Mobilization, according to Tilly (1978), refers to ‘the process by which a group 
acquires collective control over the resources needed for action’ (7), or the ways in 
which individuals are transformed into a collective actor. Following Kelly’s 
mobilization theory (1998), worker mobilization will most likely occur when these 
five elements are present: 1) there is a sense of grievance or injustice 2) you can 
attribute that directly to the employer 3) the presence of an effective organization 4) 
confidence that the action will be effective 5) the right ‘framing’ of leaders. Kelly’s 
theory, however, is workplace limited, focusing on a specific form of mobilization: the 
engagement of members in local, on-site struggles alongside fellow workers. As a 
consequence, member engagement will fade away if, for example, the sense of 
injustice disappears. I take Kelly a step further and show how organizations can 
maintain a level of member engagement over time, even if all five conditions are not 
met.  
In Organizing Urban America (2008) Heidi Swarts compares different styles 
of organizing between faith-based and secular movements. According to Swarts, 
mobilization capacity, or the ability to mobilize members, is the result of an 
organization’s resources, mobilizing culture, and strategic capacity. First, considering 
‘resources’: scholars of the resource mobilization paradigm (e.g., McCarthy and Zald 
1973) rejected Piven and Cloward’s thesis in Poor People’s Movements (1977), 
illustrating that at least a minimal form of organization is required as a tool for 
mobilizing.10 According to resource mobilization scholars, however, if social 
                                                 
10 In Poor People’s Movements, Piven and Cloward argue that poor people’s organizations and mass 
disruption are irreconcilable: the logical consequence of a formally structured organization with a mass 
membership, will be the abandonment of oppositional politics. 
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movements become too institutionalized, they manifest only weak conservative 
tactics. With my case studies I will illustrate how London Citizens, despite a certain 
level of institutionalization, still manages to mobilize their grassroots. Second, Swarts 
defines “mobilizing culture” as “shared meanings, norms and practices…tacit norms 
and values that are nonstrategic and underlie more conscious strategic framing of 
group identity and issues” (xviii). It is not always clear, however, how such culture has 
been created. By bringing in social commitment theory I illustrate the ‘relational 
culture’ of London Citizens, versus the more ‘service-driven culture’ of Connect. I 
show how London Citizens, by emphasizing joint tasks and shared responsibility, is 
capable of developing high levels of member commitment, whereas trade unions 
display only low levels. Third, to mobilize the members strategic leadership is critical 
(Ganz 2000, Hyman 2004). I illustrate the importance of leadership choices for 
organizational legitimacy. London Citizens is able to gain moral legitimacy from its 
constituents because it focuses on broad-based social issues. Connect, on the other 
hand, tries to mobilize its members around narrow workplace-related issues, securing 
merely pragmatic legitimacy and therefore short-term member mobilization. Finally, 
Swarts uses the term mobilization capacity, which implies the potential to mobilize 
rather than actual mobilization. In this thesis I use ‘sustained mobilization’ to illustrate 
not only an organization’s ability to mobilize, but under which conditions actual long-
term mobilization is most likely to occur. I argue that the following two processes are 
critical in developing ‘sustained mobilization’: cultivating social commitment and 
managing legitimacy. 
 
Cultivating Social Commitment  
The literature on union commitment (Gordon et al. 1980) shows that the greater the 
commitment, the greater the actual participation and activism (Bamberger, Kluger and 
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Suchard 1999, Fullagar et al. 2004). Union commitment is measured through beliefs 
about unionism, loyalty to the union, willingness to work for the union, feelings of 
responsibility towards the union, and faith in the objectives of organized labor. In 
addition, research has shown that some workers do join a union for ideological, rather 
than purely instrumental reasons (e.g., Heshizer and Lund 1997; Fullagar et al. 1997; 
Sverke and Kuruvilla 1995; Sverke and Sjöberg 1997). These studies distinguish 
instrumental (reward based) member commitment from normative (ideologically 
based) member commitment. The results show that union members with high levels of 
normative commitment will be more participative than members with high levels of 
instrumental commitment. Although there is extensive literature on union 
commitment, it is often treated in very static terms: something that is present, at a high 
or low level, or absent. But why do members feel loyal or responsible to the 
organization in the first place? Where does this commitment come from, or how was it 
formed? Does social identity theory provide satisfying answers? 
According to social identity theory, people will categorize themselves as 
similar to some, the in-group, and different from others, the out-group (Hogg 2006). 
They identify themselves as members of a particular category, for example, as trade 
unionists or as members of a community organization. If people have a sense of 
belonging, defining and evaluating themselves in terms of properties of the group, 
they will behave as group members. This process of social identification, then, will 
increase the probability of social action and collective protest (Stürmer and Simon 
2004). Brewer and Silver (2001) take the social identity theory a step further and show 
how social identification becomes a crucial factor in collective mobilization. 
According to their survey, there is a direct, positive correlation between the strength of 
members’ identification with a particular group and group loyalty. Although they do a 
good job in explaining how a group-based identity will be manifested, their argument 
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is less clear regarding how group identity is formed. So again, social identity is 
perceived as a static phenomenon: it is present or absent. But if feelings of social 
identity towards a group are weak or absent, how can they be strengthened?  
I argue that answers can be found by looking at social commitment theory 
linked to different forms of social exchange. This approach offers a more dynamic 
perspective on how strong levels of commitment or social identity can be formed. 
Social commitments are conceived as direct ties between individuals and larger social 
units, which may comprise local groups or organizations as well as larger and more 
distant communities or nations. Such ties involve feelings and sentiments about the 
group or group affiliation and beliefs about its normative or moral properties (Lawler 
et al. 2009). A commitment to an organization can be based on purely instrumental 
considerations, in which case people give to the group and receive benefits in return. 
This transactional tie can become relational or group-oriented, however, through an 
emotional or affective process.  
Thus, according to the social commitment theory, when people work together 
on joint tasks repeatedly over time they will develop affective ties to the group. 
Indeed, people are emotional/affective beings (Damasio 1999) and will attribute their 
individual feelings to the group. They will generate and sustain shared affiliations in a 
work organization, and are most likely to promote collectively-oriented behavior 
under the following two conditions: when the task involves joint activities and when 
there is a sense of shared responsibility. In addition, these affective ties will be 
strengthened if the sense of shared responsibility generates complementary emotions 
directed at self and others; when people communicate or share their emotions with 
each other; finally, when structures give people a strong sense of control and self 
efficacy. For example, Lévesque et al. (2005) illustrate the linkage between union 
member disaffection and social identity. Using Canadian data gathered from local 
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union leaders and members, they show how union democracy leads to less 
membership disaffection, on the one hand, and strong feelings of union identity and 
commitment on the other. According to the study, members who felt that they were 
consulted over union policy and had opportunities to shape union direction thought the 
union was relevant.   
I focus on the different forms of social exchange as one of the core structural 
dimensions generating feelings of group affiliation. Different structural ties will 
generate different degrees of group-like behavior or group-affiliated feelings. Indeed, 
different forms of social exchange have different propensities to produce stronger or 
weaker social commitments to social units (Lawler 2001). The fundamental idea of 
social exchange is the following: two or more actors can produce a joint good by 
contributing their individual resources or talents to the collective endeavor. There are 
four different structural forms of exchange: negotiated exchange, involving the 
explicit trade of goods or services based on well-defined and binding agreements; 
reciprocal exchange, involving sequences of unilateral giving between two actors over 
time; generalized exchange, a unilateral form of exchange separating giving and 
receiving, in which person A helps person B, person B helps person C, and so on; and 
finally, productive exchange, the most group-oriented form, which actors seek to 
produce a valued result through their joint collaboration.  According to the literature, 
productive exchange will result in the enhancement of positive emotions and the 
reduction of uncertainty, two distinct mechanisms crucial to explaining commitment 
and social order. This form has indeed the greatest capacity to produce person-to-unit 
ties. 
I argue that the trade union can be seen as a model of negotiated exchange, and 
the community-based organization as one of productive exchange. First, trade union 
members pay a membership fee in order to belong. There is a specific trade of 
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benefits: if you pay the fee you enjoy the services of the trade union, ranging from 
help with administrative procedures to the coverage of the collective bargaining 
contract. The absence of task jointness or the perception of shared responsibility 
towards the trade union leads, however, to weak person-to-group ties, since purely 
instrumental ties, without affective or emotional ties between the worker and the trade 
union, are not likely to generate group affiliated commitment.  
Community-based organizations, on the other hand, are clear models of 
productive exchange occurring around a collective or group project. People will 
devote time and effort to the group and in turn receive valuable benefits from the 
organization (Lawler et al. 2009). As the most group-oriented form of exchange, the 
community organization involves high degrees of interdependence, or joint control 
over outcomes (Molm 1994). For example, whenever a major demonstration is 
planned, turnout is very important. The community organization will set a target of, 
for example, 5,000 people, and will hold the leaders of the institutions accountable for 
showing up with their members. Every demonstration ends with an evaluation among 
the members in which the event is being discussed. If the goal for turnout has been 
reached, the members will applaud and congratulate one another. This positive 
outcome will enhance positive emotions, strengthen group solidarity and feelings of 
accountability and shared responsibility.  
Another important link exists between the type of social exchange and trust. 
Trust, according to Molm (2000, 2003), is defined as “expectations that an exchange 
partner will behave benignly, based on the attribution of positive dispositions and 
intentions to the partner in a situation of uncertainty and risk”. Molm shows 
empirically that reciprocal exchange produces stronger trust and affective commitment 
than negotiated exchange. In negotiated exchanges, known terms and binding 
agreements provide ‘assurance’ that one will not be exploited, without requiring trust. 
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Following Molm’s rationale, I argue that trust in a productive exchange is stronger 
than in a negotiated exchange. Community organizations are group-oriented 
institutions, in which social commitment is highly present. Strong feelings of group 
cohesion and solidarity generate a high level of trust among the actors, which further 
strengthens the group feelings.  
Finally, it is important to take into consideration the structure of trade unions 
and community organizations. According to Lawler (2009), under hierarchical 
governance, meaning the presence of strong vertical control, there will be little 
opportunity for individuals to solve joint problems through collaboration, thus 
reducing the sense of shared responsibility necessary for social commitment. Trade 
unions can be million member organizations, with local or regional offices spread all 
across a country. To maintain internal unity and order within the organization there is 
a definite vertical control, with formal decision-making procedures, and clear lines of 
individual responsibility. As a result, however, the individual member does not 
develop strong emotional or affective ties to the organization, exhibiting rather a weak 
social commitment. Community organizations, on the other hand, are based on 
institutional membership, generating a certain level of stability. I argue that this form 
of governance can be compared to a network structure. It is a cluster of independent 
institutions whose transactions are coordinated by long-term collaboration, bringing 
mutual benefits, and are linked together through relational, trust-based ties. This 
governance structure provides greater opportunity than does hierarchy for individuals 
to solve joint problems through cooperation and thus develop the sense of shared 
responsibility necessary for social commitment (Lawler et al. 2009).  
In conclusion, different types of commitment and organizational structures will 
lead to different levels of mobilization. However, cultivating social commitment 
within the organization is necessary but not sufficient: legitimacy matters, and 
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managerial initiatives affect the degree to which organizational activities are perceived 
as pragmatic versus morally legitimate.  
 
Managing Legitimacy 
The concept of legitimacy has been used to explain union decline (e.g., Lichtenstein 
1999; Murray and Reshef 1988), but often without a common understanding of what 
legitimacy is and why it matters for unions. In organizational studies, the foundational 
work of Weber (1968) and Parsons (1960) has described it as the “result of a 
relationship between an organization and its environment, with legitimacy conferred 
upon an organization when its goals are consistent with or support widely shared 
values and expectations” (Chaison, Biglow, Ottensmeyer 1993). As a consequence, 
legitimacy is considered critical, as it affects the organization’s ability to secure and 
mobilize monetary, political, or social resources and hence its very survival (Pfeffer 
and Salancik 1978, Meyer and Rowan 1977). Legitimacy matters in institutional 
environments, or environments “characterized by elaborate rules and requirements to 
which individual organizations must conform if they are to receive support and 
legitimacy” (Scott and Meyer 1991: 123). Since a trade union operates in a 
predominantly institutional environment, its organizational survival will largely 
depend on the legitimacy it confers.  
 Suchman (1995) further elaborated the organizational legitimacy research by 
defining the concept and identifying three main types of legitimacy: pragmatic, moral, 
and cognitive. Chaison and Bigelow (2002) then applied Suchman’s theoretical 
foundation of the concept to trade unions.11 First, legitimacy is defined as “a 
                                                 
11 Although Chaison and Bigelow (2002) apply this concept of legitimacy in the American context, I 
argue that the same results can be found for British unions. As mentioned earlier, British trade unions 
follow a ‘life path’ similar to that of their American counterparts: since the 1980s, they have been 
suffering a huge decline in membership, and they are currently focusing on ‘organizing’ as a way to 
revitalize the labor movement.  
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generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, 
or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions (Suchman 1995: 574). In the literature, three forms can be detected: The 
first form, pragmatic legitimacy, is considered the most narrow and elementary; it is 
based on the self-interested calculations of an organization and its constituencies; the 
organization gives something and receives something in return. This type of 
legitimacy is very weak, lacks ideological foundations, and is therefore often 
transitory: if constituents no longer find net value in supporting the organization, its 
legitimacy is threatened. Moral legitimacy, on the other hand, is conferred by 
constituencies because they perceive the activities of the organization as “the right 
thing to do”, promoting societal welfare as defined by the socially constructed value 
system. Finally, cognitive legitimacy is the most powerful source, since it is conferred 
by the constituencies’ “mere acceptance of the organization as necessary or inevitable 
based on some taken-for-granted cultural account” (Suchman 1995: 582). Whether or 
not the activity benefits the constituents, or reflects positive social valuation, the 
organizations are simply accepted as necessary or inevitable. Suchman argues that the 
power of this form of legitimacy can be explained as follows: “alternatives become 
unthinkable, challenges become impossible, and the legitimated entity becomes 
unassailable by construction”. In sum, these three forms of legitimacy can be linked; 
according to Suchman, “as one moves from the pragmatic to the moral to the 
cognitive, legitimacy becomes more elusive to obtain and more difficult to manipulate, 
but it also becomes more subtle, more profound, and more self-sustaining, once 
established” (585). 
Chaison and Bigelow (2002) use the concept of legitimacy as a frame of 
reference for “understanding the sources of union strengths and weaknesses” (96). 
Unions’ loss of legitimacy has been detrimental, as can be observed in declining 
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membership, union density, power, and influence in society (Chaison, Bigelow, and 
Ottensmeyer 1993). The authors illustrate, first, how unions have been most successful 
in winning recognition campaigns or strikes when they managed to maintain 
pragmatic legitimacy with their members (e.g., offering concrete outcomes for 
strikers) while pursuing moral legitimacy from other constituencies, such as the public 
or nonmembers (e.g., by framing the strike in broad terms of social welfare). 
According to the authors, pragmatic legitimacy alone is unsustainable and will not be 
sufficient for institutional growth or survival. Rather, both moral and pragmatic 
legitimacy are necessary, in which the former will strengthen the latter. Thus, to gain 
new constituents or maintain old ones, unions need to be perceived as socially valued 
institutions, going beyond merely serving the self-interest of members; or else, the 
survival of the organization will depend on an instrumental cost-benefit analysis and is 
likely to be rejected. According to the authors “[p]ragmatic legitimacy cannot be 
assumed in the absence of a shared view of the moral legitimacy” (57).  
 The authors continue by showing how unions gain moral legitimacy from 
coalition partners or the general public when engaging in particular actions or 
campaigns (e.g., anti-NAFTA campaign), without thereby gaining moral legitimacy 
permanently as institutions. Indeed, the public confers moral legitimacy on their 
actions when they “do the right thing”, but not on the unions themselves. As a 
consequence, unions must constantly seek to renew moral legitimacy on a situational 
basis and “show that their traditional activities transcend parochial concerns. At the 
same time, unions must respond to pressure from their members to maintain pragmatic 
legitimacy” (89). Chaison and Bigelow conclude on a rather pessimistic note, arguing 
that unions’ neglect of the pursuit of moral legitimacy, while assuming the presence of 
continuous pragmatic legitimacy, leads to their inability “to attract new members, to 
retain present ones, and to maintain an influential position in the economy” (95).  
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 Chaison and Bigelow have not only shown the importance of legitimacy for 
unions’ survival, but have argued as well that gaining or maintaining legitimacy does 
not occur passively, depending rather on the unions’ strategic decision-making. This 
argument clearly draws on Kochan, Katz, and McKersie (1986), who emphasize the 
strategic choices made by leaders of management, labor and government that shape 
the transformation of industrial relations.  
In conclusion, the leadership greatly influences the type of organization. Will it 
be an ‘insurance’ organization, protecting ‘vested interests’ and thus merely feeding 
into the instrumental needs of its constituencies, or will the it act as a ‘sword of 
justice’, standing for deeper ideological social values, acting as the ‘social fabric’ of 
society? In line with Chaison and Bigelow (2002), I argue that trade unions are having 
difficulties in gaining moral legitimacy from their constituents, but are rather 
perceived as vested interest groups based on pragmatic legitimacy. Community 
organizations, on the other hand, are pushing to gain moral and even cognitive 
legitimacy as they strive for social justice and social change.  
The following table illustrates the effect on mobilization, linking the form of 
commitment with the kind of legitimacy: 
 
Table 1. Member Mobilization  
 LEGITIMACY 
COMMITMENT PRAGMATIC MORAL 
Negotiated  Short-term Conflict:  non-existent 
Productive  Short-term Long-term 
 
 
 25 
First, I argue that moral legitimacy and productive exchange between the 
members and the organization will lead to long-term sustainable member mobilization. 
When pragmatic legitimacy is combined with a mere negotiated exchange between the 
group and the members, mobilization will not be sustainable over time. When, 
however, pragmatic legitimacy is combined with a productive exchange between the 
members, member participation might be more intense than in the previous case, but it 
will not be sustainable over the long term. Finally, members are left in an ambiguous 
state when the organization wants to be a more morally ‘minded’ organization, while 
the members have joined out of pure self-interest: member mobilization will be 
virtually inexistent.12  
 In the following two chapters, I illustrate how the organizations exhibit their 
different forms of legitimacy and member commitment, as well as the consequences in 
terms of member mobilization. 
                                                 
12 As I will explain further, this is especially the case when an organization ‘shifts’ from a pragmatic to 
moral type of legitimacy. 
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CHAPTER 5 
LONDON CITIZENS  
 
Our job as organizers is to challenge this culture, where people don’t 
meet. 
 
At the beginning of every Assembly it is important to recognize the 
institutions that are present. 2,500 people were in the room; at the end 
there was a ‘roar’ in the room that felt like power, like it never felt 
before. 
 
(London Citizens Organizer) 
 
On July 11, 2008, over a thousand Zimbabweans and Britains gathered at Parliament 
Square: the Zimbabwe Action was about to take place. Since the political situation 
became dangerous, many Zimbabweans fled to England. The majority are refused 
asylum-seekers living clandestinely in England; they changed their names, lying about 
their identity in order simply to survive. Recognizing the dire conditions of these 
exiles, the community-based organization London Citizens called for them to have the 
right to work. They organized a Mass at St Margaret’s church, followed by speeches 
on Parliament Square and a rally in the heart of this vibrant city, crossing the Thames 
and passing Big Ben, with the goal of handing a letter to Gordon Brown, UK prime 
Minister, explaining their call for action. The Action Day was a big success: over 
1,000 people showed up, singing and dancing; people felt inspired and empowered to 
make a change. 
It was during that summer that I joined London Citizens’ Summer Academy 
School. For about six weeks I was immersed in LC’s organizational structure; I took 
part in its campaigns, attended its meetings, and was involved in daily activities. As of 
today, December 2009, the British government has not yet made any firm decision on 
the situation for tens of thousands of Zimbabwean immigrants. On the other hand, the 
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ties between the Zimbabwean Catholic Community and London Citizens have grown 
significantly, encouraging the former to become a member of LC.  
In this chapter I examine London Citizens’ origins, its strategies to develop 
strong membership commitment and to gain moral legitimacy, and finally, its 
structure.  
 
The Origins of Community Organizing in Britain 
Community organizing is relatively commonplace in the US. In Britain, however, 
broad-based organizing didn’t fully develop until the late 1980s. If we go back to the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries, the British trade unions were based in the 
communities, playing critical roles in shaping those communities. Communities were 
‘places in which people could walk to and from work, … places where work, home, 
leisure , industrial relations, local government and home-town consciousness were 
inextricably mixed together’ (Hobsbawm, 1987: 40). The urban and industrial areas 
displayed a distinct working-class culture, and trade councils were established in all 
the major towns and cities. In 1868, activists of the trade unions, grounded in local 
communities, formed the Trade Union Congress (TUC). This period of ‘community-
based trade unionism’ evolved into a ‘representational community unionism’ during 
the 20th century, when the Labour Party was formed (Wills and Simms 2004). The 
trade unions, through the Labour Party, were represented in local and national 
government, working on issues of public policy and the redistribution of wealth.  The 
trade unions were able to shape community life directly through worker representation 
or indirectly through the political power of the Labour Party. Historically, the labor 
struggles in Britain, such as the London Match-girls’ strike of 188813, the London 
                                                 
13 Due to poor working conditions at the Bryant & May’s match factory in Bow, London, women and 
teenage girls, led by socialist activist Annie Bensant, went on strike. This led to the establishment of the 
first trade union for women in Britain. 
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Great Dock Strike of 188914 and the Poplar Council revolt in the 1920s15, promoting 
workplace-based solidarity and community support, were key events leading to the 
first Labour Party majority in the House of Commons in 1945 (Weinbren 1998). 
Labour-controlled councils, a new form of local governance, mushroomed.  
During the 1960s and 70s, although it was a period of remarkable social 
movement activism, ‘no mass community … developed’ (Twelvetrees, 2002: 6). 
According to Miller (2001), this failure was linked to the institutionalization and/or 
bureaucratization of community organization. Lowe (1986) argues that the local, 
grassroots mobilizations became bureaucratized either once they had met their 
demands or when the campaigns turned into organizations. Furthermore, in the 1970s, 
the trade unions’ legitimacy greatly weakened: the transformation of the economy, 
such as the de-industrialization and rise of global competition, and eventually, in 1979, 
the electoral victory of the Conservative Party, led by Margaret Thatcher, were part of 
the blame. And although the Labour Party tried to use its control of the local councils, 
its struggles failed, most spectacularly in London where Thatcher abolished the 
Greater London Council in 1986 (Livingstone 1988).16  
The arrival of community organizing in Britain during the 1980s was thus 
energized by several factors (Jamoul 2006). First, Thatcherism dismantled the safety 
nets of the welfare state, eroding the representation of the working people. The 
policies of the New Right were directed towards economic regeneration at the expense 
of community or social welfare. Second, the Church of England, acknowledging that it 
was failing as an institution to support the neighborhoods, became a major initiator of 
                                                 
14 The dock workers, mainly unskilled, poorly-paid and casual workers, of the port of London went on 
strike. This resulted into a strong trade union among the dock workers. 
15 During the 1920s, in Poplar, one of the poorest neighborhoods in London, a major tax protest took 
place. This revolt received wide support from the general public as well as from the trade unions. 
16 Not all the local councils were abolished, but they were combined with other councils. The 
Conservative Party had pure political motives, since by doing so, they robbed the more radical inner-
city councils of much of their power. 
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community organizing projects. Its ‘Faith in the City’ report documented the political 
and economic deterioration of the urban areas, leading to the formation of the Church 
Urban Fund. The main task of this fund was to assign resources to city-wide broad-
based to support projects responding to the decline of these urban areas and to the 
powerlessness that people felt. The Church Urban Fund is still a critical funder of 
community organizing projects. Finally, recognizing the seriousness of the situation, 
social workers and senior clergy from the UK went to the US and attended the IAF 
training course. It became clear that the American model of building power and doing 
politics through the community was not only viable but also necessary. 
 
London Citizens 
London Citizens, launched in 1995, is the oldest and largest broad-based community 
organizing association in Britain. The organization is a unique alliance of over 120 
institutions. Based on Saul Alinsky’s model, London Citizens focuses on skill and 
leadership development of the community members and takes collective action for 
social change through forceful streetlevel campaigns. London Citizens has been able 
to survive and thrive on a budget of less than £400,000 per year: The bulk of its 
income, about 85%, comes from donations or grants from external foundations. The 
remaining 15% comes from its membership dues.17 
While roughly 120 institutions are part of London Citizens, the organization 
has only about seven paid community organizers and a total staff of 12. Although this 
number seems very low – trade unions can have hundreds of people working for them 
– actual member mobilization is impressive.  
 
                                                 
17 The total funds for the year 2008 were around £380,000 (about $630,000) (source: London Citizens, 
Annual Report 2008). 
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Cultivating Social Commitment: Relational Culture 
 
They [London Citizens] don’t have much money so the power is from 
people; … if you can get enough people from different communities … 
to form relationships with each other, that then gives you the potential 
to mobilize power to change things in the community; … in practice 
that means that you have to foster relationships between very different 
groups and people to get the business done. 
 
(Interview LC member) 
 
Community organizers believe in the power of individual relational meetings, the so-
called one-to-one conversations. A one-to-one is a face-to-face conversation with the 
aim of exploring or strengthening the ties between the community organization and 
the particular institution. These conversations focus on asking ‘why’ more than ‘what’ 
and are the means to build and maintain relationships, aiming to understand the other 
person’s reasons and motivations and to build trust. As one organizer explained, ‘you 
listen and tell them about you, not about your lives at Oxford’. As a general rule, a 
community organizer should undertake ten to fifteen one-to-ones a week. These 
relational meetings are the backbone of the organizations and vital for all the member 
communities. The community leaders believe that without these conversations, the 
relationship with the individual members will be weak and superficial and, as a 
consequence, the institutions will flounder and fail. Thus, the main aim is to build 
relational power.  
In addition, community organizers believe in the “Iron Rule” - never do for 
others what they can do for themselves (Alinsky 1971). The organizations will create 
the context for leadership development, offering training in the art of politics and 
organizing, which can range from intensive 10-day training to shorter periods or 
evening programs. The members are not reduced to ‘clients’ or ‘categories of need,’ 
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but are considered active citizens with strength and talent, democratic and 
entrepreneurial potential. The issue of skill development and capacity building is 
highlighted through the Summer Academy Training program and other leadership 
training sessions throughout the year. The Summer Academy, for example, held each 
summer since 2003, trains student organizers undertaking action and research tasks, 
focusing mainly on living wage issues and low wage sectors. This training program 
has proved to be an excellent recruitment base for new London Citizens organizers.  
Finally, every year London Citizens holds a major assembly in which all the 
institutions come together, evaluate the past year, and decide which issues they will 
tackle the following year. At the beginning of the assembly, a representative of each 
institution goes on stage and says “we pay the dues to the community organization”. 
This symbolic gesture is significant in many ways: publicly paying dues enforces the 
commitment and accountability of each single organization; but more importantly, 
when one institution after the other comes on stage and lays down the money, a 
feeling of power and strength goes to the group as a whole. The single institutions feel 
part of something bigger, something powerful. Moreover, the politicians who are often 
invited to attend the assembly remain astonished by the public display of commitment 
and total power. London Citizens, however, doesn’t set an increase in sheer 
membership numbers as its main priority. Thus, if an institution pays its dues but 
never shows up at an assembly, it is hardly considered a member (Interview LC 
trustee).  
 
Managing Moral Legitimacy: Campaigning on Broad-based issues 
London Citizens works on multiple issues, such as living wage, jobs and skills 
training, affordable housing, immigration and asylum rights. London Citizens started 
the first living wage campaign in Europe, inspired by ground-breaking living wage 
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campaigns in the United States (Luce 2007; Holgate and Wills 2007). Rather than 
replace unions, the campaign demonstrated that unions and community-based 
organizations can work together for mutual advantage (Wills 2004). LC leaders 
decided to target the hospitals and health sector first, then the banks, later the 
universities. These campaigns received good media coverage and resulted in huge 
successes for the city’s low-wage workers. The campaign ‘Our Homes, Our London’ 
called for affordable housing through community land ownership. London Citizens 
augmented the pressure and pulled out a major, highly visible stunt that was all over 
the mainstream media. In July 2007, over 100 families camped out in red tents by City 
Hall, urging immediate action. Another campaign, ‘Strangers into Citizens’, calls for a 
new asylum policy, implementing an ‘earned regularization’ model as a ‘pathway into 
citizenship for long-term migrants’ (London Citizens 2009). As a result, on May 7th 
2007, over 10,000 people marched from Westminster Cathedral to Trafalgar Square to 
put the issue of undocumented migrants in the UK back on the political agenda. 
Moreover, every action is followed by a moment of reflection or evaluation: What did 
we do right? What did we do wrong? How can we improve? Discussing among the 
members whether the goals have been achieved is an important element, spurring 
feelings of accountability and control. It is part of the internal democracy of the 
organization. 
The Living Wage Campaign, ‘Our Homes, Our London’ or ‘Strangers into 
Citizens’ are shining examples of collective action campaigns strategically deployed 
by London Citizens to achieve its goals, which at the same time also strengthened its 
membership base and increased its legitimacy among the broader public. Indeed, a key 
to its success has been the ability to mobilize thousands of people.  
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Dynamic Structure: ‘Paralysis of Overanalysis’ 
During my training at London Citizens, the Director would often mention ‘the 
paralysis of over-analysis’. As one member put it, ‘there is that kind of energy and 
flexibility to say yes we’ll do it and see where it goes; we will not think about it for a 
year.’ Indeed, as a community organization, LC focuses on direct action rather than on 
endless discussions of ideas or theories. 
London Citizens’ small and flexible structure allows it to be dynamic, making 
it easy to adjust to environmental changes. When an action or idea does not work, it 
will be discarded. For example, in 2006, the members voted to target the hotel and 
hospitality sector. Since the Olympics are coming to London in 2012, and many hotels 
are being built, it is important to ensure that the hotel workers have good employment 
conditions. As a result of hard lobbying and negotiating with the former Mayor Ken 
Livingstone, a statement of economic guarantees was signed at City Hall to include 
payment of the London living wage to all workers on Olympic projects. This was a 
tremendous victory for London Citizens. An additional outcome of the hotel campaign 
was the creation of the ‘London Citizens Workers’ Association’ (LCWA), a unique 
attempt to organize London’s low-wage migrant workers.  Although the main purpose 
of the LCWA was to eventually bring the workers into a trade union, tensions between 
these two organizations began to grow. As a result, London Citizens decided to drop 
this project and shift its focus again towards negotiations with management.  
Decisions are made democratically through regular Strategy Teams and large 
Assemblies, increasing the feelings of shared responsibility and the sense of control. 
These meetings are quite different from traditional union meetings. First, someone is 
given the honor to open the meeting with a reading, or a profound reflection. Then, 
they go around the room and ask who you are, and which institution you represent. 
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“Who you are” is part of the organizational culture, fostering again a sense of 
accountability and loyalty towards the group.   
Furthermore, these institutions work as a ‘check’ on each other. In that way, 
the organization tries to guard against becoming too bureaucratic or oligarchic as this 
would undermine its ‘movement’ ability. According to an LC member, ‘when too 
much focus is on a certain action, to get a grant, other people may say ‘wait a minute, 
that is not our objective and steer it back in another direction’. This can be tied to the 
concept of goal displacement, or how an oligarchic leadership structure will lead to a 
loss of member commitment. Community organizations learn how to get around goal 
displacement (e.g., Osterman 2006b).  
In conclusion, the case of London Citizens illustrates, first, how the relational 
culture within the organization has been key in building trust and solidarity among the 
members and towards the group. One-to-one conversations are LC’s main tools in 
cultivating intense feelings of social commitment among the members. Second, the 
different campaigns demonstrate its broad, multiple issue agenda, rather than a single, 
narrowly defined one, gaining thereby moral legitimacy from the members and the 
public. Finally, the dynamic structure enables London Citizens to increase member 
participation and to avoid oligarchy or goal displacement.  
What are some of the similarities with or differences from a trade union? What 
kind of campaigns do unions engage in, and how could we describe their underlying 
organizational culture? In the next chapter, I discuss the case of the trade union 
Connect.
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CHAPTER 6 
BRITISH TRADE UNION CONNECT  
 
Before going more into detail on the Connect case, let me provide some background 
information on the origins and the current state of affairs of the British trade unions in 
general. Traditionally, the system of industrial relations in the UK has been 
characterized by voluntary relations between the trade unions and the employer 
organizations, with minimal state interference (Eurofound 2009). In 1868, the Trades 
Union Congress (TUC) was formed; in 1871, the Trade Union Act recognized trade 
unions as legal entities, granting them the right to strike. The 19th and early 20th 
century, a period of economic prosperity, was conducive to the development of trade 
unionism. This system, in which collective bargaining was far more important than 
legal regulation, grew remarkably in the post-war years, highlighting the role of the 
trade unions in securing industrial peace and efficiency.     
 During the 1960s and ‘70s, however, as a result of the economic crisis, both 
industrial conflict and trade union militancy grew. This culminated in the election of a 
conservative government, led by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, in 1979. Her anti-
union and neo-liberal agenda contributed to a catastrophic decline in trade union 
membership: legal restrictions were placed on trade unions’ ability to engage in 
industrial action; the majority of sectoral collective agreements were dismantled; and 
many areas of the public sector were privatized.18 In 1997, a ‘New Labour’ 
government under Prime Minister Tony Blair was elected. As a way of offering a 
more conciliatory approach to trade unions, the Employment Relations Act (ERA) 
1999 was introduced. This statutory procedure for union recognition, involving the 
                                                 
18Currently, collective bargaining occurs mainly at the company level, spurring high levels of 
decentralization. According to Visser (2004), the degree of bargaining centralization in the UK stands at 
a mere 13%. 
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Central Arbitration Committee (CAC), can oblige an employer to recognize a union 
that can demonstrate a certain level of employee support.19 According to Brown et al. 
(2001) a central aim of the ERA is to promote voluntary recognition agreements, 
while using the statutory route as a last resort.20    
Despite the ERA Act, the Labour government, and some occasional small rises 
in membership since 1997, trade union density in 2008 stood at a historic low of 28%, 
or about 6.5 million members; there are about 200,000 union reps and 3,000 full time 
officers and organizers (Interview TUC organizer). As a result of this decline in 
membership, many British trade unions have merged: in 1988 there were 326 unions; 
this went down to 238 in 1998, and finally to 167 in 2008 (Eurofound 2009). Since the 
mid 1990s, to reverse the decline, British trade unions have increasingly engaged in 
recruiting and organizing new members based on the US ‘organizing model’ (Gall and 
McKay 2001; Heery et al. 2000). In 1998, the TUC Organizing Academy was 
established to train union organizers and help unions that are organizing for growth 
(TUC 2009). In September 2008, the TUC introduced a new initiative, the Activist 
Academy, to develop the skills of union reps and workplace activists and provide 
support and resources to build stronger unions in the workplace (TUC 2009).21 In the 
following paragraphs, I will lay out how Connect is facing challenges of membership 
decline and member ‘disaffection’. Although the focus is on Connect, I include some 
quotes by other trade unionists addressing similar issues.    
                                                 
19 This process is similar to the system of certification under the National Labor Relations Board in the 
US. 
20According to Gall (2005a), however, the number of voluntary recognition agreements has fallen from 
a high of 685 in 2001 to 239 in 2004. 
21 In the UK, the trade union movement created the Labour Party in 1901. As a result, British trade 
unions considered the Labour Party their main tool of power: everything gets done through the political 
machinery, so there are fewer mass union demonstrations than, for example, in France. Today, 
however, many British trade unions realize how the political landscape has changed: the Labour Party is 
no longer merely the expression of the labor movement; second, there is a real chance that the Tories 
will come to rule again. This is not to say that the British trade unions will start mobilizing their 
members on the streets; however, they do realize that power must come from within, that workplace 
activism is needed. 
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 Connect is an independent trade union, affiliated with the TUC, representing 
workers in the telecommunications industry. Its origins, like that of the industry itself, 
lie in the publicly owned Post Office. From its foundation during the First World War 
until British Telecommunication’s (BT) privatization in 1984, there were only two 
employers for which its members worked: the Post Office and Kingston Upon Hull 
Telephones, both public sector. Although the union started off by representing first 
line engineering managers, it gradually increased its scope to cover all workers in 
supervisory, technical and managerial roles. In 1984, BT was privatized, which meant 
that the union had to change its ‘ethos’ from public service to private company 
(Connect 2009). The union is now dealing with global companies in a free market. As 
a consequence, it has slimmed down its bureaucracy, centering its activities on 
members’ needs, developing e-based systems, and taking a professional approach to 
organizing members. In 2000 it was named Connect, representing about 20,000 
members in over 600 companies, from multinationals to self-employed consultants. 
Currently, negotiations are ongoing concerning a merger with Prospect, which would 
create the UK’s largest professional and managerial union. Prospect represents about 
102,000 engineers, scientists and managers working in the private and public sectors 
in fields such as energy, the civil service, heritage, agriculture, defense, shipbuilding, 
transport and the environment. Connect would become part of a dedicated sector for 
communications workers within Prospect.   
Since Connect is a rather small union, gaining membership is absolutely 
critical to its survival. As one officer puts it, ‘it is important to have the income stream 
going’. The bulk of Connect’s membership comes from BT. Immediately after the 
post-privatization, however, there was a massive membership reduction. At its height, 
Connect had about 30,000 members, but by the mid 90s this had come down to 
17,000. Different factors can be highlighted: BT downsized drastically, offering many 
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unionized workers very good voluntary redundancy packages; furthermore, the union 
moved from the public to the private sector. In the UK, union density in the public 
sector is still very high or about 59%. Joining a public sector union seems almost a 
natural thing, or a ‘right thing to do’. A big constrast can be found in the private 
sector, with only about 16% union density. As Connect shifted to the private sector, it 
was no longer a given that workers would join a union.                  
 As a result, the union found itself with two options: manage the decline or go 
after growth in new areas. Connect decided upon the latter: their strategy for reversing 
the decline was to ‘re-brand’ the union. First, they put increased resources into 
organizing, engaging a professional organizing team. Second, they expanded the range 
of offered services, creating their own job search service and advice service, thereby 
attracting people who didn’t know anything about unions. According to the Director of 
Organizing, the new people who came into the industry did not match the ‘traditional 
union member’ profile anymore. Many were young and female, rather than middle-
aged white men, and often they came in without a union background. In addition, the 
job search service, helped to retain many of BT’s redundant workers. During the last 
five years, the union recruited about 3,000 members, becoming actively involved in 
organizing drives in O2, Vodafone, T-Mobile, and Ericsson, while at the same time 
trying to improve their membership base at BT.  
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Service-driven Culture 
 
The deal was: I join the union, I pay my subs [dues], there is no other 
expectation; if I need you [the union], you will be there. So when we 
start to talk about our curriculum to our members, it is like turning 
around an oil tanker: We told them one message when we brought them 
into the union and now we bring another… If we believe in 
collectivism and participation then we need the courage to say this to 
people; because at least the people will be recruited on a genuine basis. 
 
(Organizer TUC) 
 
One issue Connect and other unions struggle with is the problem of ‘service-driven 
recruitment’. Workers will join mainly to get protection; they don’t join to become 
active in the union. Indeed, the union is portrayed as an insurance company, and, 
unless the individual is immediately affected by a certain issue, tends to be just 
‘something that is there’. One TUC organizer said that the union has been called ‘the 
fourth emergency service’: First you have the police, the ambulance, and the fire 
brigade, then the union. Just as you hope you never need to call the police, you hope 
you don’t need the union. Although servicing its members is part of what a union is all 
about, that is not the only message Connect wants to get across. The union aims at 
fostering activism as well under a ‘union building’ approach to membership growth: 
Both servicing and organizing are crucial; indeed, the ‘servicing’ versus ‘organizing 
model’ is, by many trade unionists, considered a false dichotomy.22 Union officers 
underscore the importance of the link between individual membership, member 
participation, and the effectiveness of the union, creating, in other words, a 
membership that is conscious of its collective contribution.     
 At Ericsson, the management unilaterally tried to change the terms of the 
contract without consulting any of the employees. As a result, one union member 
                                                 
22As Fletcher and Hurd (1998) argue as well, these two ‘models’ should not be considered mutually 
exclusive. 
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called the Connect organizer and asked what the union would do about it. The 
organizer kicked the ball back into the member’s camp, saying ‘what can you do about 
it?’ Rather than accept the changes to the contract, their explicit strategy was to 
mobilize and collectivize what seemed to be an individual issue by getting the 
members and non members to say ‘no’ to the new contract. The workers established 
an ad hoc committee and had weekly meetings by conference calls with other 
workplace reps to discuss the union strategy. According to the organizer, ‘I gave input, 
but it was more done by them. They set the agenda, wrote newsletters, they were 
persuading colleagues… Everyone who was affected knew exactly what the union’s 
position was and what we were recommending. This gave clarity and confidence.’ 
When the employer wanted people to sign up for changes in benefits and conditions, 
95% of the employees, including non members, refused to sign the agreement. 
Eventually, the company backed down. Even though Connect doesn’t yet have a 
recognition agreement with Ericsson, this case demonstrated to the workers that a 
union, by working together, can effectively defend their interests.  
 
Workplace related, Issue-based Organizing 
As mentioned before, between 1979 and 1997 the British trade unions were under 
attack, ideologically and politically, and as a result faced a massive membership 
decline. The easiest option was therefore to sell membership as an individual service 
(Interview TUC organizer). Since 1997, however, many British trade unions shifted 
more towards an ‘organizing approach’, emphasizing collective action and 
participation in order to reverse the decline. There is a strong belief among the 
organizers that a latent pool of workers is out there that can be activated. Their 
passivity is not due to apathy; but the question then becomes how to go from passivity 
to activity, how to find a way to inspire or agitate them, a way to encourage them and 
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to support them. According to the trade unionists, the most effective way is to recruit 
around an issue. The next step is to collectivize that issue, start campaigning around it, 
identifying ‘leaders’ among the workers, and eventually building a strongly organized 
community.23          
Connect, although a rather small union, has been heavily involved in two types 
of organizing campaigns: Greenfield organizing, in workplaces where no union is 
present, as well as Brownfield or Infill organizing, expanding the membership where 
there is already a union in place. The next three scenarios illustrate different leadership 
strategies and relationships between the union and the workers: a failed recognition 
campaign at T-mobile; a successful campaign at Vodafone; and finally, building 
‘Industrial Relations (IR) Committees’ in the well-established BT union branch. 
 In late 2000, Connect, together with the Communications Workers Union 
(CWU), engaged in a recognition campaign at T-Mobile. Owned by Deutsche 
Telecom, one of the largest telecom companies in the world, T-mobile employs about 
6,000 workers in the UK. Although both unions had members in T-mobile, this base 
was rather small and fragile (Gall 2005b). By early 2003, the unions thought they had 
the majority of the workers behind them, but when they held a recognition ballot, they 
lost. The Director of Organizing comments, ‘we had an over-optimistic view of where 
we stood in relationship to coverage and membership support’. In 2007, on the other 
hand, Connect won a recognition campaign at Vodafone after years of fighting. 
According to the national officer, Connect learned from the T-Mobile experience and 
adopted a different strategy. First, the T-mobile campaign was led mostly by 
professional organizers, without really engaging the workplace reps: the recruitment 
                                                 
23 Another way to attract this layer of activists is by creating new union roles at the workplace, such as 
union learning reps or environmental reps. These reps are more likely to be women, blacks, young, or 
recent hires. Currently in the UK there are about 24,000 union learning reps, and they are paid by the 
employer. (Interview TUC Director of Organizing).   
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was ‘organizing-led’ and was all about ‘getting the numbers in’. The Vodafone 
campaign was led in a different way: the strategy was to have a team of reps rather 
than a team of organizers. The union was able to create momentum by fostering active 
relationships between the reps and the union on the one hand, and between the reps 
and the workforce, on the other.  
According to the national officer:  
 
We tried to get a team spirit going. It wasn’t just me saying ‘do this’; I 
gave the sheets themselves to the reps; it is about running at people’s 
own speed; don’t give too many negative messages like ‘we didn’t 
achieve this or that’, but concentrate on where we were winning; 
concentrating on shared success is really important and that helped to 
build the momentum up. 
 
 (Interview June 2009) 
 
Second, T-mobile hired the Burke Group, an American anti-union consulting 
firm. In his study on union organizing in the ‘new economy’, Gregor Gall (2005b) 
shows how employer hostility is one of the major explanatory variables in accounting 
for variation in the outcome of union recognition campaigns. Gall argues, however, 
that employer hostility is not ‘necessarily decisive in creating barriers between the 
union, its members and non-members’. According to Gall, what is critical is the 
employer hostility vis-à-vis union strength.  Indeed, in the T-mobile case, the level of 
member commitment was very low, exhibiting a weak workplace unionism incapable 
of fighting the Burke group. During the Vodafone campaign, on the other hand, the 
number of lay activists grew, making the campaign less dependent on outside 
professional organizers, while nurturing strength and power from the reps and the 
workers themselves. According to the national officer, Vodafone also obstructed the 
campaign, but the union was able to keep the organizing drive under its control 
without allowing it to be dependent on the good will of the employer.   
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 Vodafone has been used as a success story within the British labor movement: 
a small union wins recognition from a giant multinational. A few words of caution, 
however, are needed: the campaign absorbed huge amounts of resources, as it lasted 
15 years, intensified over the last three years; the recognition affects only a couple of 
hundred workers; finally, only a few years after the union ‘victory’, this group of 
workers got transferred to Ericsson. According to a Connect organizer, ‘the 
recognition itself, therefore, doesn’t mean that much. It is about having a different 
mobilizing approach; it is about keeping them active.’ On the other hand, what the 
leadership hoped for was to establish a good relationship with Vodafone and increase 
the company’s understanding of what the union was all about, eventually enabling the 
union to get more groups recognized. This approach, however, was not successful. 
 
We try to approach the company, saying we are a union who operate in 
the industry, we understand the industry, we’re pragmatic, we 
understand our members, we don’t have to persuade our members, we 
are in touch with our members.  
 
(Interview Director of Organizing, June 2009) 
 
Thus, the Vodafone campaign, although initially appearing to be a successful 
case, proved hard to sustain in the long-term. The union did not manage to foster a 
‘win-win’ relationship with the company and now that the group of recognized 
workers has been transferred to another company, the organizing work has to be done 
all over again. 
Finally, Connect’s relationship with British Telecommunications is deeply 
rooted in history. The workers didn’t have to fight for recognition, since the union was 
always there, ‘part of the furniture’. The members are also different, as they are 
managerial, unlike the engineers or technicians at, for example, Ericsson. To avoid 
‘apathy’ among the members, the leadership came up with ‘Industrial Relations 
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Committees’ (IRCs) targeted at workplace reps as a way to democratize the decision-
making policies. Rather than deciding everything from Connect’s central headquarters, 
or top-down, the union aims at motivating the reps to play a bigger role in that 
process. Since the reps are the main artery between the workforce and the union, it is 
critical to make them more visible and participative. About 12 people serve on the 
IRCs and each of them has a different task such as, talking to the members, setting up 
meetings, etc.  
The national officer explains,  
 
We need to work out how we can be more visible. Saying to them [the 
reps], ‘you will organize a meeting in your building, you will set it up, 
and run it’. It is important to get their confidence… If we want good 
reps, and we need good reps to organize, it is not going to happen from 
behind a key board writing charts, that is not going to work. There is a 
people thing, a people’s skill here. 
 
(Interview national officer, June 2009) 
                              
Structural Challenges            
When Connect decided to add an organizing team to its traditional union structure, 
different challenges arose. First, many interviewees discussed the tensions that occur 
between the young, excited, ‘looking to stir up the place’ organizers on the one hand, 
and the full-time union negotiators trying to maintain a good relationship with the 
employer, on the other.  This tension lies again at the heart of the debate between 
unions taking up an organizing approach and thus enabling people to do things for 
themselves, versus a more traditional servicing role, where the full time officer 
negotiates for the members.  
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The following example illustrates this challenge:  
 
In Ericsson, despite being a Greenfield site, we are trying to gain 
recognition. But last May a group of unionized workers from Vodafone 
have been transferred into Ericsson. Now… the national officer wants 
to be on good terms with Ericsson. But that is problematic for me, 
because I don’t wanna be on good terms, but I try to mobilize people to 
demonstrate what a bunch of bastards these people are.  
 
(Interview Connect organizer) 
 
Second, the leadership stresses the importance of ‘social partnership’ between 
the union and the employer, striving for a ‘win-win’ outcome, maintaining peaceful 
relations with the employer and thereby emphasizing the role of the negotiator. This 
seems counter to the idea of campaigning and mobilizing the workers. According to a 
TUC organizer, one of the problems is that organizers are trained to have a 
relationship with the members and the union reps but not with the employer. Although 
Heery (2002) makes important suggestions for how to attenuate the tensions that arise 
from combining a partnership and an organizing approach, in practice it is not always 
that easy, as the Ericsson example above shows.24      
 Finally, tensions arise as well between the organizers and the workplace reps. 
Workplace union reps are considered the ‘glue’ between the workforce and the 
union;25 they are indeed the primary contact between the union and the members and 
are accountable to the branch structure and to the members. The strategic decision on 
                                                 
24 According to Heery (2002), one way to manage the tensions is to ‘conceive of partnership as the end-
point of organizing’ (32). By so doing you draw upon the strengths of both models: partnership might 
be constructed on the collective power of workers within the firm (rather than neglecting the issue of 
power and assuming union-management collaboration) while broadening the agenda of representation 
(rather than focusing on narrow union functions which often happens at the end of organizing). 
25 Union reps are the equivalent of US shop stewards. They are paid by the employer and elected by the 
members or appointed if there are not enough members at the workplace.  
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where organizing should be focused, however, happens at the top level (in case of 
Connect, the director of Organizing), and then cascades down to the branches. For 
union reps, however, increasing the membership at the workplace can be problematic: 
first, many reps are already swamped with individual casework, and more members 
would just mean further augmenting their workload. Second, union reps might be 
worried about losing their union position. As it is an elected job, it might be on the 
line if suddenly a lot more workers can vote on it. Finally, if the rep has a good 
relationship with the employer, an organizing campaign might jeopardize that 
position. As a consequence, in many cases the rep will have no incentive to initiate an 
organizing drive, so tensions between the organizer and the reps occur. The union 
officials claim it is important to increase the role and participation of the reps since 
they are the visible manifestation of the union in the workplace.  
According to a TUC organizer: 
 
We have to promote the role of the reps. Increased time for union 
representatives should be on top of our list. I think members value what 
reps bring: if you got a problem with your workload, or if you got an 
idea about how the job can be done better, and no one from 
management listens to you, you want someone in the workplace from 
the union to whom you could go to. So I think members understand the 
deal, but I think we need to find the language, about the importance of 
them [reps] becoming more active and participating in the union. I 
think this is a fundamental principle of organizing.  
   
(Interview June 2009) 
 
In reality, however, many reps consider individual case work their main role, 
whereas organizing should be done strictly by outside professionals. In terms of 
organizing workplaces, however, union leaders realize that these workplace reps are 
key to member engagement. As a national officer puts it, ‘trust between the members 
and the reps is vital; without it you don’t progress, you can’t achieve recognition’. As 
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a way of dealing with this issue, the TUC started the Activist Academy in 2008, aimed 
at redefining the role of union reps within the workplace. Connect is eager to 
participate in this new program.        
 In conclusion, the case of Connect illustrates, first, how its ‘service-driven 
culture’ makes it more difficult to develop strong membership commitment. Second, 
trying to mobilize a significant number of workers over strictly workplace-related 
issues is not sustainable in the long-term. Even though the Vodafone campaign 
seemed successful, it took huge amounts of resources to get the momentum going, and 
once these recognized workers were transferred to Ericsson the union had to start from 
the beginning: identifying the issues, collectivizing these issues, seeking leaders 
among the workers, and so on.  In addition, little support can be expected from other 
social actors in the larger community, such as faith organizations or schools, as these 
issues are framed too narrowly. Finally, structural challenges come to the forefront as 
well: tensions between the professional organizers on the one hand, and negotiators, 
workplace reps, and Connect’s leadership on the other, make sustained member 
mobilization difficult.    
Now, considering the case studies of London Citizens and Connect, what can 
we learn?  
 48 
CHAPTER 7 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS  
 
How can these organizations be compared? To what extent is the organizational 
structure different? What are the different strategies in terms of cultivating social 
commitment and managing legitimacy? What can be learned from this? These 
questions are addressed in the next paragraphs. 
 
Organizational Structure 
Diverse institutions compose London Citizens’ membership, providing the 
organization with the necessary resources, legitimacy, and stability. This network-
based organization, with LC as the central point, has a horizontal decision-making 
process: every member institution attending the yearly Assembly will vote on the 
issues LC will take on or the policies it should address. LC, as an organization of 
organizations, has a dynamic structure, in which actions are taken up instantly and 
unsuccessful projects will be discarded. Attending staff meetings, I was impressed by 
the lively participation, the energetic brainstorming, and the immediate action that 
followed. Indeed, this dynamic structure encourages sustained mobilization.26  
 Trade unions, on the other hand, are rather bureaucratic, with clear hierarchies 
and slower decision-making processes. Although Connect is a rather small, centralized 
union, there is still a hierarchy in place. Important decisions, such as where to 
mobilize, come from the top and cascade down to the branches. Internal 
contradictions, moreover, come to the forefront: as shown in the case study, the new 
                                                 
26 Although some organizations can be part of LC for pragmatic reasons rather than moral, and some 
member organizations might be more hierarchical than others, eventually, under the London Citizens 
umbrella, this difference disappears. Indeed, LC can be seen as a two-tier organization, or an 
organization with two ‘hats’, which makes this model sustainable in the long-term.   
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role of organizer – Connect has put enormous amounts of resources into organizing 
and employs a team of 12 dedicated organizers – can clash with the long, well-
established role of negotiator or workplace rep, again decreasing member 
mobilization.  
 
Sustained Mobilization 
Considering both organizations I argue that two main differences can be found. First, 
in terms of cultivating social commitment: for London Citizens, the main goal is to 
build relational power among the institutions and the members. LC emphasizes the 
value of having one-to-one conversations between its organizers and a priest, an 
imam, a school principal and other institutional leaders, to build mutual trust and 
cooperation. As LC’s Director puts it, ‘the fight is the development of people, rather 
then winning the next struggle. There will always be struggles, but if you don’t have 
enough informed citizens, if you don’t have enough allies, then you won’t get very 
far’.  Indeed, for LC, ‘first comes power, then program.’ According to LC organizers, 
to engage in sustainable, 10-year long campaigns, the most important element is to 
build an organizing base; this base is the power base from which the campaigns will 
flow. For trade unions, often the opposite is true: they start by identifying the issues, 
engaging in campaigns before power in the organization is built. As a consequence, 
they might win that one campaign – as the Vodafone example shows – absorbing an 
enormous amount of resources, which in the long run is not sustainable. In addition, 
London Citizens will organize around talent and aspiration, not around need; the ‘Iron 
Rule’ is never to do for others what they can do for themselves. This rule goes back to 
the notion of building power among the members, rather than treating them as victims. 
Trade unions, on the other hand, will often perceive the workers as ‘clients of special 
needs’. Many trade unions find it hard to move away from ‘service-driven 
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recruitment’ towards emphasizing the importance of an active role of members and 
reps in the workplace. Connect is trying to change this by emphasizing shared success, 
union visibility and member participation.      
 Second, in terms of managing legitimacy: Connect focuses more on narrowly 
workplace-related issues, including pay or working conditions, whereas London 
Citizens frames its campaigns in broad social justice terms, such as living wage, 
adequate housing, or immigrant rights. This is not to say that other unions don’t 
engage in broadly framed, social justice campaigns.  As a consequence, LC members 
and its coalition partners will confer moral legitimacy on the organization’s actions, 
which will result in an active grassroots base (e.g., over 10,000 people participated in 
LC’s ‘Strangers into Citizens Campaign’). Connect, on the other hand, seeks to gain 
merely pragmatic legitimacy from its members (e.g., the union tried to ‘sell’ its service 
during the T-mobile and Vodafone recognition campaign) and from the employers 
(e.g., during the Vodafone campaign, the union hoped that the employer would see the 
benefit of having a union in the company). This pragmatic legitimacy, however, turns 
out to be ephemeral and transitory. It does not sustain a high level of mobilization in 
the long run. For example, the employer Vodafone doesn’t confer any legitimacy on 
the union but rather obstructs any union presence. In addition, during these recognition 
campaigns Connect did not attract any support from other social or political actors, as 
the subject of the campaign was too narrowly focused.  
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Now, going back to the figure, what have the case studies shown?  
 
Table 2. Member Mobilization  
 LEGITIMACY 
COMMITMENT PRAGMATIC MORAL 
NEGOTIATED Short-term 
e.g., T-Mobile Campaign 
Conflict:  non-existent 
 
PRODUCTIVE Short-term 
e.g., Vodafone Campaign 
Long-term 
London Citizens 
 
First, London Citizens, as a result of its moral legitimacy and productive 
exchange between the members and the organization, illustrates a high level of 
member mobilization, sustainable over the long-term. Second, Connect’s T-mobile 
campaign is an example of pragmatic legitimacy combined with a mere negotiated 
exchange between the group and the members. As a result, the level of member 
participation will not be as high and will not be sustainable. Third, the Vodafone 
campaign represents a case of pragmatic legitimacy with a productive exchange 
between the members. Member participation was more intense than in the T-mobile 
case, but it was not sustainable over the long term. Finally, a conflict emerges when 
the union tries to combine a more morally ‘minded’ organization, while the members 
joined out of pure self-interest: member mobilization will be almost absent. 27 The 
following example illustrates this conflict: In 2004, Unison, UK’s largest public sector 
union, took a firm position against the war in Iraq and urged all of its members to 
                                                 
27 In my interviews with Connect, I focused mainly on the three campaigns mentioned above: the failed 
T-mobile campaign, the successful Vodafone campaign, and the formation of IR Committees at BT, all 
about trying to show the union’s pragmatic function. I did not come across a Connect campaign framed 
around social justice issues or, in other words, a case in which the union would demand moral 
legitimacy from its constituents. 
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come out and demonstrate. In March 2004, millions of people came out on the street 
and demonstrated in London. Although many members turned up, they did so not 
because they felt part of the union, but rather because of individual, political concerns. 
As a Unison rep puts it, ‘they were not with the branch, not with the branch banner, 
but they were amorphously in the demonstration; if they get engaged, they do so 
because they are personally interested in it already, not because the union asked them 
to do it.’ (Interview Unison rep, June 2009).  
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
 
Is there a paradox? At the outset of this paper I asked why trade unions are 
experiencing difficulties in mobilizing their members. These organizations have 
numerous resources but struggle to achieve new or active commitment. Community 
organizations, on the other hand, have to survive on a much smaller pool of resources 
but manage nonetheless to exhibit a high degree of member engagement through 
collective action.  
Drawing on social commitment theory, I argue that community organizations 
represent a productive form of exchange, generating positive emotional responses 
from members to the organization, thus leading to a high degree of social 
commitment. These organizations focus on building “relational power” among their 
members, bringing the values of loyalty, trust, and collectivity to the forefront. In 
addition, their network-based structures are likely to produce strong person-to-group 
social commitments. Trade union membership, on the other hand, represents a form of 
negotiated exchange. Trade unionists perceive their membership rights as direct 
compensation for their dues. This form of exchange entails less task jointness than 
does productive exchange, so members are less likely to ascribe their positive feelings 
derived from task activity to the group. Individual casework takes up the bulk of union 
representatives’ time, substituting individualization for collectivism in union work; 
this low degree of social commitment results in a low level of participation. The 
hierarchical structure is moreover likely to produce weaker person-to-group social 
commitment than do network forms of organization. 
Social commitment is a necessary but not sufficient condition for obtaining 
sustained mobilization. It requires, as well, leadership capable of making strategic 
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choices as to whether to act and which tactics to use. Community organizations, 
focusing on broad political, social, or ideological, rather than narrowly defined issues, 
are able to gain ‘moral legitimacy’. As a result, they feed into a large, active layer of 
members, gain support from outsiders, and remain sustainable in the long run. Trade 
unions, on the other hand, behaving more like insurance companies than a labor 
‘movement’, have pragmatic rather than moral legitimacy. Their campaigns focus on 
narrowly defined workplace issues and as a consequence, the level of member 
participation remains low and the support of outsiders is lacking.  
In conclusion, I believe trade unions should take a step back, cultivate member 
commitment and its ability to (re)gain legitimacy, instead of focusing only on 
organizing campaigns. First, I believe the TUC’s recently established Activist 
Academy is an important step in the right direction. It might be better, however, to 
‘merge’ the Activist Academy with the Organizing Academy rather than keeping these 
structures separately. Second, Connect, as shown in the case study, is making efforts 
to increase member commitment and mobilization as well (e.g., the IR Committees at 
BT). I believe, however, that focusing on workplace by workplace recognition 
campaigns will not be sustainable for Connect or other British unions. Instead, the 
British labor movement needs to gain back its moral legitimacy by rekindling its 
identity as a ‘sword of justice’. 
Further research could analyze differences between countries. If my findings 
show that in the UK there is a lower degree of commitment and mobilization among 
the trade unions than among the community organizations, is this also the case in the 
US, or in continental Europe? What differences come into play when comparing 
across countries? Second, what if we look at different types of trade unions, 
comparing a ‘servicing model’ with an ‘organizing model’, or a less hierarchical with 
a very tight hierarchical union structure, or a union which engages in broad coalition 
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campaigns, framing its actions in social justice terms, versus a union which doesn’t? 
Will we find differences in commitment or mobilization? These are still unanswered 
questions that can spur future research.  
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